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Abstract and Keywords
Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the 
philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several 
dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and 
invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are 
motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant 
conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least 
four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-
mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive evaluation (the “guise 
of the good”), we cannot desire what we think is actual (the “death of 
desire” principle), and, in neuroscience, the idea that the reward 
system is the key to understanding desire. The second part of the 
introduction summarizes the contributions to this volume. The hope is 
to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on this neglected, 
albeit crucial, aspect of the mind.
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OUR LIFE IS imbued with desire. While some people desire to see the 
ocean, others want to live in New York. While some people want to 
understand the laws of the universe, Juliet simply aspires to kiss 
Romeo. Some desires are stronger than others. Some last longer than 
others. Sometimes we are happy because one of our desires is 
gratified; on another occasion, we may cry due to the frustration of a 
desire. These are among the many platitudes of the life of desire. One 
may wonder: What is this thing called ‘desire’? What is the essence of 
desire? This is the main question addressed in this volume.
Desires play an important role in our lives. Yet contemporary 
philosophy has neglected the issue of the nature of desire as 
compared with investigations of perception, belief, emotion, intention, 
and other types of mental states. Although there are some notable 
exceptions to this neglect (Marks 1986; Stampe 1986, 1987; 
Schroeder 2004; Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007; Friedrich 2012; 
Arpaly and Schroeder 2013), it is fair to say that no live debate on the 
nature of desire is presently taking place (see Schroeder 2015 for a 
similar diagnosis). The aim of this volume is to redress this imbalance 
by bringing together scholars who adopt different perspectives on the 
subject. The volume aspires to draw a taxonomy of the main 
conceptions of desire and to create a fruitful debate about this 
underexplored topic. But why is it important to understand desire, 
and what does the philosophy of desire consist of? In what follows, 
this question is answered from three distinct angles.
Beyond the Dogma of the Motivational Conception of 
Desire
The lack of a real debate about desire is perplexing. The central 
explanation for this fact is, we believe, that one intuitive view of 
desire is often taken for granted in the philosophical literature. It is, 
we conjecture, the main dogma of desire. Since Hume, most 
philosophers have assumed that desire is essentially a motivational 
state (Armstrong 1968; Stampe 1986; Stalnaker 1984 Smith 1994; 
Dretske 1988; Dancy 2000; Millikan 2005). In this “hydraulic” view of 
desire (McDowell’s 1998 expression), desire is the spring of action 
par excellence. To desire, for example to listen to a symphony, is 
nothing but being inclined to do so—end of story. The motivational 
conception of desire is rarely defended in detail, but it is presupposed 
in numerous debates. Most interpretations of the notion of direction 
of fit rely on it; functionalist accounts of desire often mention it in 
passing; standard views of action and decision making in philosophy 
and economics build on it; and disagreements about whether desires 
can be reasons for acting often revolve around it. From this 
(p.2) 
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perspective, action and motivation are key to understanding desire. 
But is motivation all there is to desiring?
There are reasons to doubt it. To start with, our folk concept of desire 
appears much richer. When we acknowledge our desires, are we 
merely talking about our motivations to act? Intuitively, professing my 
desire to see Juliet seems to go beyond conveying the motivation to 
act so as to see her; it seems to express something deeper. 
Furthermore, looking at the history of philosophy or the 
contemporary literature, there is another approach to desire that 
deserves special attention. On this conception, to desire something is 
to evaluate it in a positive light. Desiring to swim in the river is to 
represent this state as good in some way or other. According to this 
evaluative conception, which can be traced back to Aristotle at least 
and which has found new advocates recently, goodness is the crux 
around which desire revolves.1 Given their historical pedigree, we 
shall call the motivational and evaluative conceptions the “classical 
views of desire.” On the face of it, they seem very different. The 
evaluative view is centered on goodness, while the motivational view 
concentrates on motivation. Now, goodness and motivation seem to 
be distinct concepts despite the intimate relations that exist between 
them. As the debate on moral motivation has taught us, it might be 
that one could positively evaluate a state of affairs without being 
motivated to realize it. It is thus fair to ask which one of the two 
conceptions captures desire best. Is desire essentially a motivational 
state? Is it a positive evaluation? Is it both? Or is it neither? 
Most of the essays in this collection explore the classical views of 
desire. This is one way of going beyond the dogma that desiring is the 
state of being motivated and of adopting a more critical stance on the 
nature of desire.
(p.3) 
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Revisiting Other Philosophical and Empirical Dogmas of Desire
The philosophy of desire touches on many other issues, however. A 
survey of the philosophical literature reveals that several principles 
about desire are often taken for granted and are rarely put into 
doubt. In other words, there are other dogmas of desire. This book 
aims to discuss these dogmas too, covering more minutiae than is 
usually the case, from the perspective of the nature of desire. A brief 
presentation of these dogmas is thus in order.
Desires are often contrasted with beliefs in terms of their direction of 
fit. According to this metaphor or figurative way of talking, beliefs are 
supposed to fit the world, while the world is supposed to fit our 
desires.2 In the case of a mismatch between the world and our beliefs, 
our beliefs should change—not the world. Changing the world so as to 
fit a belief would be inappropriate. Consequently, beliefs have the 
mind-to-world direction of fit: they aim at truth. In contrast, when the 
world does not correspond to some desire, the world should change. 
Changing a desire simply because it is frustrated would be wrong. 
Desires thus have the world-to-mind direction of fit: they aim at 
satisfaction. There is an important debate about the meaning of this 
notion (see Smith 1994; Humberstone 1992; Zangwill 1998; Gregory 
2012; Archer 2015). Despite these controversies, the standard 
interpretation of the world-to-mind direction of fit of desire is 
motivational in spirit: in the case of a mismatch between desire and 
the world, subjects should act to bring about the satisfaction of the 
desire. This common interpretation fits well the motivational view of 
desire. Is it correct? Does the world-to-mind direction of fit reveal that 
desires are essentially motivations (see Gregory, Lauria, Railton this 
volume; for detractors of the metaphor, see Sobel and Copp 2001; 
Milliken 2008; Frost 2014)?
In addition to aiming toward satisfaction in the way explained, desires 
are often said to aim at the good, just as beliefs aim at the truth (De 
Sousa 1974; Velleman 2000; Hazlett unpublished). One way of 
understanding this slogan is to interpret it as follows: one cannot 
desire something without “seeing” some good in it. Call this the 
“guise of the good” thesis. The “guise of the good” thesis has an 
important historical pedigree: it can be traced back to at least Plato, 
was at the heart of the scholastic conception of desire in the Middle 
Ages, and is often referred to in the contemporary literature.3
Although friends of the evaluative conception of desire naturally 
embrace this thesis, other views are compatible with it: that desiring 
involves a positive evaluation does not imply that it is a positive 
(p.4) 
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evaluation. Can we not desire something without seeing any good in 
it? If so, what does this teach us about desire (see Oddie, Massin this 
volume; for detractors of this thesis, see Stocker 1979; Velleman 1992;
Döring and Eker this volume)?
Another dogma that is less often examined concerns a form of 
impossibility in desire. Since Plato, it is common to think that one 
cannot desire what one already has. Consider that I want to climb 
Mount Etna. The intuition is that as long as I have a desire to climb 
Mount Etna, I have not climbed it. As soon as I have, my desire 
extinguishes itself. Desires are for absences, or, less metaphorically, 
they are about what is not actual.4 Although some scholars disagree 
about the formulation of the principle (see Boghossian 2003; Oddie 
2005; Lauria this volume), some version of the principle is often taken 
for granted. What does this reveal about desire (see Oddie, Lauria, 
Massin this volume)? And is it true (for detractors, see Heathwood 
2007; Oddie this volume)?
Finally, leaving armchair philosophy, it is uncontroversial in the 
neurosciences that desires are strongly implicated in the reward 
system and are closely connected to the neurotransmitter dopamine 
(Schultz 1997; Schultz, Tremblay and Hollerman 1998; Schroeder 
2004). According to the standard neuroscientific picture, desire 
involves the anticipation of reward and the encoding of prediction 
errors: in desiring something, one anticipates some reward (say, a 
banana) and then compares the expected reward with the actual 
obtaining of the reward. In this way, desires are crucial for learning in 
the sense of adapting one’s behavior to one’s environment. How can 
this help us understand the nature of desire (see Schroeder, Railton, 
Lauria this volume)? Examining these four dogmas is another way of 
questioning the received wisdom about desire and has the potential to 
shed new light on its essence.
Beyond the Philosophy of Desire
The issue of the nature of desire is important per se, but it can also 
illuminate other philosophical puzzles—controversies in which desires 
are frequently mentioned and their role examined without 
sufficient attention being paid to what they are. In the absence of a 
clear conception of desire, these debates are on shaky ground. This is 
especially so given that the motivational view of desire is often simply 
assumed. Let us present three examples of important debates 
featuring desires in, respectively, philosophy of mind, ethics, and 
meta-ethics, which could benefit from a deeper understanding of 
(p.5) 
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what they are. This will reveal the wider philosophical significance of 
this book.
The direction of fit of desire is often considered an essential feature 
of desire, but it has broader ramifications in the philosophy of mind 
and of language (Searle 1983). In the philosophy of mind, it is used as 
a tool to contrast conations or states meant to modify the world (e.g. 
desires, intentions, needs) from cognitions or states meant to 
represent the world (beliefs, perceptions, etc.). This Humean picture 
of the mind is at the heart of traditional philosophical accounts of 
agency and the main models of decision making in economics. If our 
exploration into the nature of desire can elucidate the metaphor of 
direction of fit, it will eo ipso clarify the general issue of the taxonomy 
of the mental and of other types of representations suggested by the 
metaphor. This has far-ranging implications, since it can help to put in 
perspective traditional accounts of agency in philosophy and 
economics (see Railton this volume).
In ethics the most significant line of research about desire concerns 
its role in the explanation and justification of action. Can desires be 
reasons for acting in a certain way? If they can, are they motivating 
reasons, normative ones, or both? Although scholars disagree on how 
to answer these questions, they often rely on implicit and varying 
conceptions of desire—most of the time presupposing that desiring is 
nothing but the motivation to act. Addressing the issue of the nature 
of desire should thus help to solve the puzzle of their practical role. 
How can one determine whether desires are reasons for acting 
without knowing what they are? Four contributions in this volume 
attest to the fact that one’s stance on the nature of desire has 
relevant implications for this investigation (Döring and Eker, Alvarez, 
Friedrich, Gregory this volume).
Finally, in meta-ethics desires appear in the debate about the very 
nature and definition of value. According to the mainstream fitting 
attitude analysis of value, what is good is just what is worth desiring 
(Broad 1930). Prima facie, this debate seems disconnected from the 
question of desire’s essence and seems to rest on an intuitive grasp of 
what counts as a desire. Yet, as Oddie’s essay reveals, the question of 
the nature of desire can contribute to this meta-ethical puzzle as well.
A more detailed examination of what desires are can thus lead 
to a better understanding of important and various philosophical 
concerns. We have focused here on established controversies where 
(p.6) 
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desires surface, but it goes without saying that more neglected issues 
will also benefit from this inquiry (see the second part of this volume).
With these clarifications in mind, the aim of this volume can be 
further specified as follows. In addition to examining the classical 
views of desire, this collection of essays purports to explore the 
dogmas about desire one finds in the literature. And it does so with an 
eye to the implications the nature of desire has with regard to wider 
controversies.
The book is divided into two parts. The first tackles directly the 
question of the essence of desire; the second addresses unexplored 
issues in the philosophical literature that bear on conceptions of 
desire. In the remainder of this introduction, we summarize each 
contribution and raise questions that connect each with other essays 
in the volume. This should convince the reader that a fruitful and rich 
debate about the nature of desire has begun.
I. Conceptions of Desire
Are desires positive evaluations? Are they motivations? Are there 
alternative conceptions? What does the empirical evidence suggest 
about the nature of desire?
This section is divided into four subsections corresponding to each 
question raised.
Evaluative Views: Desire and the Good
Is goodness the key for understanding desire? In their contributions, 
Oddie and Friedrich, elaborating on previous work, answer this 
question affirmatively. To desire, they argue, is to be struck by the 
goodness of certain things. Imagine a person who is disposed to 
switch on any radio she encounters (Quinn 1993). She is not doing 
this because she enjoys it or thinks there is something good about 
turning on radios (e.g. she considers it a means to listen to music). 
Rather she does not see any good whatsoever in the action she is 
performing. Does she desire to turn on radios? Quinn’s (1993)
intuition, which is shared by Oddie and Friedrich, is that this person 
does not desire to switch on radios precisely because she does not see 
any good in it. Hence a desire should involve a positive evaluation. 
Ultimately it might be that desire is essentially a positive evaluation. 
Which type of evaluation? Both contributors agree that the 
evaluation that is crucial to desire does not amount to desires being 
evaluative judgments.
(p.7) 
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In his contribution “Desire and the Good: In Search of the Right Fit,” 
Oddie defends the “value appearance view.” In this conception, to 
desire something is for this thing to appear good. Juliet’s longing for 
Kyoto is the same thing as Kyoto appearing good to her. More 
specifically, Oddie expounds on the idea that desire and goodness fit 
like hand in glove, defends the view against objections, and presents 
a new argument in its favor. If we conceive of desires as value 
appearances, we may hope to fruitfully address issues surrounding 
the nature of values. The argument proposed concerns chiefly the 
fitting-attitude analysis of value: the thought that goodness is what is 
fitting to favor, in particular, what is fitting to desire. This analysis has 
been criticized on the grounds that it cannot account for “the wrong 
kind of reasons” to favor something (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen 2004) and for the existence of “solitary goods” (Bykvist 
2009). Oddie elegantly specifies desiderata for the positive attitude 
that is part of the analysis so as to make it immune from these 
problems and to find the right fit between goodness and desire. The 
positive attitude should be a representation of a value and should 
neither entail a belief about goodness nor the presence of this value 
outside the mind of the favorer. Moreover, Oddie stresses that value 
judgments should stem from an experiential source that is not an 
evaluative belief and that entails desire. Desires, he argues, can fit 
this bill provided they are value seemings, i.e. representations of 
values. As the experiential source of value, they imply neither beliefs 
about goodness nor the existence of the value represented. And they 
entail desires.
Friedrich defends another variant of the evaluative conception in his 
“Desire, Mental Force and Desirous Experience.” His approach is 
original in that he addresses the issue by means of the distinction 
between mental force and mental content. Consider the contrast 
between asserting p and ordering p. Intuitively, both representations 
involve the same content, p, but they differ in their linguistic force. 
Friedrich’s proposal is that desires are positive evaluations in the 
sense that they involve a mental force that is evaluative in nature. 
Desiring is thus the representing of a state of affairs with the mental 
force of goodness. In this picture, desire differs from evaluative 
beliefs and value appearances: it is not a cognitive state but consists 
in a sui generis evaluation. What is this evaluation and evaluative 
mental force? Building on a similar proposal for the case of pleasure, 
Friedrich proposes to account for evaluative mental force in 
phenomenal terms. Desiring, in this view, involves a distinctive feeling
—the ‘desirous experience’—consisting of the feeling of felt 
need. When desiring a cup of coffee, one represents having coffee as 
(p.8) 
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good, in that one feels the need for coffee and that one must have it. 
This captures the phenomenal tone of desire and can in turn explain 
desire’s special motivational power.
The intuition that desires are evaluative representations is 
compelling. The authors do a great job of exploring it and rebutting 
several objections to the evaluative conception. Still, some questions 
remain and other contributions in the volume help to frame them.
Is it enough to represent a state of affairs in a positive way to desire 
that state of affairs? There are reasons to doubt it. For instance, one 
might positively evaluate that Mozart lived a longer life yet not desire 
this: one would rather wish that he lived longer (Döring and Eker this 
volume). Similarly, one can evaluate positively the fact that Obama 
was elected without desiring so, as one is aware that this state of 
affairs has obtained (Döring and Eker this volume). And, having lost 
hope, Pollyanna could believe that being in jail is after all a good 
thing without desiring to be there (Döring and Eker this volume). Or 
consider that Othello is clinically depressed: he represents 
Desdemona’s well-being as a good thing but, because of his 
depression, fails to desire that she fare well (Lauria this volume). 
Aren’t these possible scenarios? Strictly speaking, the evaluative 
conception does not entail that all positive evaluations are desires; 
some might be other phenomena such as emotions or long-standing 
affective states that involve desires only indirectly (see Oddie this 
volume). But isn’t, then, the evaluative conception too modest as an 
account of desire? The appeal to the feeling of felt need might be 
helpful, since it seems to go beyond mere positive evaluation. But 
does this not amount to giving up on an evaluative account of desire 
and switching to a deontic approach like the one explored by Lauria
and Massin in this volume?
The second question that we can raise about the evaluative 
conception of desire is more dramatic: Do all desires involve a 
positive evaluation? Do we desire everything under the “guise of the 
good”? This question is answered negatively by Döring and Eker, who 
open the exploration of the motivational conceptions of desire.
Motivational Views: Desire and Action
Desires bear a special relation to action and are usually thought of as 
explaining intentional actions. The fact that you are reading this book, 
say, can be explained by your desire to do so. This explanatory role is 
often understood in terms of two further features of desire. The first 
is that desires explain intentional actions in virtue of being 
dispositional states. The second is that they explain intentional (p.9) 
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action because they involve an evaluative component. In their 
respective contributions, Döring and Eker and Alvarez examine this 
explanatory role of desire and, in particular, the two facets just 
mentioned.
In “Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want,” 
Döring and Eker approach the issue of desire’s role in the explanation 
of actions by questioning the guise of the good thesis. They retrace 
the motivation for thinking that we desire only what seems good to us 
to the intuition that desires explain action through the evaluative 
component they involve, as Radioman-type scenarios are meant to 
reveal. However, in an original manner, they argue that Radioman’s 
scenario does not support the evaluative view. Indeed, Radioman’s 
behavior is not made more intelligible by appealing to his positive 
evaluation of switching on radios; quite the reverse. For such an 
evaluation is puzzling in itself. And this seriously undermines the 
main motivation for the evaluative picture. More generally, the 
authors argue that the evaluative conception, whether in its doxastic 
or appearance version, is inadequate. As has already been pointed 
out, evaluation might not be sufficient for desiring. The authors go as 
far as to argue that evaluation is not a necessary feature of desire: 
one might desire to tell a joke despite being aware that it is a bad 
thing, desire to go to the kitchen to have a drink without any positive 
representation of this state taking place, or want to watch a movie 
without having made up one’s mind about its value. Desires thus do 
not involve the guise of the good. This is not to say that they are just 
dispositions to act, however. The authors propose a more holistic 
motivational conception of desire: desires might involve wider 
agential dispositions, such as the disposition to form long-term plans 
or agential policies. This, they suggest, is absent in Radioman’s case 
while he undergoes an urge to switch on radios. Agential dispositions 
might thus suffice to make sense of his behavior without reference to 
the “guise of the good.”
Döring and Eker’s contribution is very challenging, as it casts doubt 
on one of the main dogmas of desire and does so by disputing the 
classical lesson drawn from Radioman’s scenario. They rightly point 
out that appealing to evaluation would not help make Radioman’s 
behavior less bizarre. Yet doesn’t a desire provide pro tanto
justification for some action, irrespective of how strange the desire is 
(see Oddie this volume)? Consider that Radiowoman desires to switch 
on radios because she represents this action as good. Would it not be 
irrational to refrain from turning on radios given her state of mind? 
Isn’t the oddness of an action distinct from its justification? And 
would the appeal to a policy of switching on radios make 
Introduction
Page 11 of 27
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New 
York University; date: 05 October 2017
Radiowoman’s behavior less puzzling? This touches on the 
vexed question of whether desires justify actions and how they could 
do so.
In her contribution, “Desires, Dispositions and the Explanation of 
Action,” Alvarez tackles this issue from an unexplored angle. She 
agrees that desires figure into action explanation in virtue of being 
dispositions. She thus proposes to explore the role of desire in action 
explanation by investigating the dispositional nature of desire. 
Dispositions can exist at some point in time without being manifested 
at that time: a sugar cube can be soluble even if it does not dissolve 
now. Similarly, I can desire something, at some point in time, even if I 
do not manifest my desire at this time. Desires are thus dispositions. 
But to what are they dispositions? In other words, how are we to 
characterize their manifestation? The traditional answer to this 
question is that desires are dispositions to act. By contrast, Alvarez 
argues that the manifestations of desire constitute a much richer set: 
it encompasses behaviors (e.g. actions), expressions (e.g. linguistic 
acts), and inner mental states (e.g. anticipated pleasure). By 
exploring the variety of desire’s manifestations, Alvarez proposes an 
integrative approach to desire that reconciles rival accounts of desire 
(e.g. the hedonic and the motivational conceptions of desire). In 
addition, investigating further the relation between desires and their 
manifestations sheds new light on how desires explain action. Desires 
differ from physical dispositions such as fragility and solubility. A 
glass is still fragile even if it never breaks or manifests its fragility in 
some way; what is needed is that it would do so in some 
circumstances. Desires are not like this: one cannot desire something 
without manifesting the disposition in some way or other, i.e. being 
disposed to act or expect some pleasure, etc., as is attested by the 
fact that we do not attribute a desire for holidays to a person who 
never thinks about holidays, never expects pleasure from a holiday, or 
never considers taking one. It appears that desires are dispositions 
that cannot exist without at least one of their manifestations taking 
place. This invites us to think about the way desire explains action in 
a more holistic fashion than is usually the case.
At this junction we may wonder how the dispositional profile of desire 
relates to the classical views of desire. For instance, does the fact that 
desires are dispositions admitting of various manifestations go 
against the thought that they are essentially evaluations? Is the 
evaluative nature of desire not one way of unifying their manifold 
manifestations? We begin to appreciate how complex the relations 
(p.10) 
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between the different conceptions of desires and the various 
perspectives we may have on them can become.
Another question concerns the intuitive distinction between 
dispositional or standing desires, on the one hand, and occurrent or 
episodic ones, on the other (see Döring and Eker this volume). 
Some desires, like Romeo’s desire that Juliet fares well, are 
dispositional or standing: they typically last longer than others 
(Romeo desires this his whole life long); they still exist when they are 
not conscious (e.g. when Romeo is sleeping); and they admit future 
manifestations (every time Juliet is suffering, Romeo’s desire that she 
fare well manifests itself). Other desires, like Sam’s desire to smoke a 
cigarette right now, are episodic or occurrent: they are short-lived, 
typically conscious, and do not admit of reiterated manifestations. 
How does this distinction connect with the thought that desires are 
essentially dispositions? Isn’t there a tension between the view that 
desires are dispositions and the distinction between episodic and 
dispositional desires that is standard in the literature? Are there two 
senses of dispositionality involved here? This important ontological 
question will be left open here.
(p.11) 
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The Deontic Alternative: Desires, Norms, and Reasons
So far we have concentrated our attention on the classical views of 
desire and have briefly presented more holistic conceptions that build 
on them. Very recently an alternative perspective on desire has 
emerged: the appeal to deontic entities such as norms or reasons as 
opposed to values and motivation.
In his contribution “The ‘Guise of the Ought to Be’: A Deontic View of 
the Intentionality of Desire,” Lauria criticizes the classical pictures of 
desire and proposes the deontic view. In this conception, which can 
be traced back to Meinong (1917), to desire a state of affairs is to 
represent it as what ought to be or as what should be. Desiring to see 
the ocean is representing this state as what ought to be. Desires 
involve a specific manner of representing content: a deontic mode. 
Lauria provides three arguments for this picture, which correspond to 
the dimensions of desire that the classical views cannot 
accommodate: the arguments of direction of fit, of death of desire, 
and of explanatory relations. This is not to say that there is no grain 
of truth in the classical conceptions. Lauria suggests that desires are 
grounded in evaluations and, in turn, ground motivations. In other 
words, it makes sense to explain my desire to see the ocean by my 
positive evaluation of such a landscape. And desiring to see the ocean 
can explain why I am disposed to do so. This explanatory profile of 
desire is illuminated by the deontic view as follows. Some states of 
affairs (say, that people don’t die of cancer) ought to be because they 
are good, and subjects ought to bring them about because these 
states of affairs ought to be. If desires are deontic representations, it 
is not surprising that they are explained by evaluations and, in turn, 
explain motivations. For this is the mental counterpart of the 
meta-ethical explanatory relations already mentioned. The deontic 
view can thus accommodate the intuitions that drive classical views of 
desire. Yet as far as desire is concerned, these conceptions slightly 
miss their target.
Lauria’s contribution brings a new perspective to the classical views. 
One line of criticism raised by other contributors to this volume 
concerns the “death of desire” principle—one of the dogmas of desire. 
Lauria assumes that a desire ceases to exist when one represents that 
its content obtains. And he argues that this is satisfactorily explained 
by the deontic view, because norms cease to exist when they are 
satisfied: a state of affairs, say, that it rains, cannot be such that it 
ought to obtain and is obtaining at the same time. Yet both the 
explanandum and the explanans are questionable. Consider that 
Hillary wants to be the first female president of the United States and 
(p.12) 
Introduction
Page 14 of 27
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New 
York University; date: 05 October 2017
that at some point she becomes president (Oddie’s example in this 
volume). Can she not still desire to be the first female president of the 
United States despite knowing that she has won the election? 
Moreover, can she not believe that things are exactly how they should 
be and rightly so (Massin this volume)?
Another question concerns the degree of sophistication that desires 
end up having in the deontic view. It seems that babies and non-
human animals have desires. Do they really represent things as what 
ought to be? Prima facie, this seems a quite complex representation 
compared to evaluations or motivations. This worry is reminiscent of 
the objection often raised against doxastic views of desire (see 
Friedrich, Döring and Eker this volume) and examined by some 
contributor (see Gregory’s reply).
Adopting a similar approach in his “Desire, Values and Norms,” 
Massin argues that the formal object of desire is better construed as 
being deontic than evaluative. In other words, desiring something 
implies representing it under the guise of the ought-to-be or of the 
ought-to-do (the “guise of the ought” thesis). Unlike Lauria, Massin 
appeals to norms in general, not only norms of the ought-to-be type. 
Moreover, he considers that the “guise of the ought” thesis is 
necessary but not sufficient to desire. The argument he proposes 
focuses on the polarity of desire. Aversion is the polar opposite of 
desire, as hate is the polar opposite of love. Still, the two pairs of 
opposites differ. The opposition between desire and aversion, argues 
Massin, is best understood in deontic rather than evaluative terms, 
and this contrasts with love and hate. A detour in deontic logic 
reveals why. Logic teaches us that obligation and interdiction are 
interdefinable: they define each other with the help of negation. 
Something is forbidden (say, stealing) if, and only if, it is obligatory 
that this thing does not happen (it is obligatory not to steal); 
something is obligatory (say, stopping at the red traffic light) if, and 
only if, it is forbidden that this thing does not happen. Goodness and 
badness, however, aren’t interdefinable in the same way. A state’s 
being good is not equivalent to its negation being bad. It might be 
elegant to wear a hat, but this does not mean that not wearing it is 
bad: not wearing it might be neutral. Now, Massin argues, desires 
and aversions are interdefinable, just as obligation and interdiction 
are. Desiring something is equivalent to being averse to its negation, 
and being averse to something is to desire it not to happen. Desiring 
to wear a hat is equivalent to being averse to not wearing it: it is 
incompatible with being indifferent to not wearing it. In contrast, 
liking something is not equivalent to disliking its negation: liking 
(p.13) 
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cheesecake is compatible with indifference toward not eating 
cheesecake. Therefore, desire is to aversion what obligation is to 
interdiction, and love is to hate what goodness is to badness. The 
“guise of the ought” thesis thus fares better than the “guise of the 
good.”
Massin’s approach sheds light on the polar opposition characteristic 
of desire by appealing to polarity in meta-ethics, two issues that are 
rarely discussed. It can be put in perspective with the help of two 
questions.
The first concerns the restriction to obligation. Does a desire for 
something involve representing this thing as being obligatory? The 
other deontic accounts defended in this volume appeal to deontic 
entities like what ought to be (Lauria) or reasons (Gregory) without 
putting an emphasis on obligation. How are we to capture the deontic 
entity that is relevant for understanding desire?
The second issue concerns the relation between the polarity of desire 
and the essential features of desire. As observed, one might divorce 
the two features: that the polar opposition of desire is best 
understood in deontic terms is prima facie neutral with regard to 
desires being essentially deontic representations. This, however, 
contrasts with what other of our contributors assume. From the 
perspective of the evaluative view, it is natural to think that the polar 
opposite of desire, i.e. aversion, is a negative evaluation precisely 
because desiring is a positive one (Oddie, Railton this volume). What 
is the relation between polarity and the essence of desire?
In his contribution “Might Desires Be Beliefs about Normative 
Reasons for Action?,” Gregory defends another type of deontic view: 
the desire-as-belief view. He argues that desires are beliefs about 
reasons to act. Desiring to drink coffee is to believe that one has a 
normative, defeasible reason to do so. This claim differs importantly 
from all others, since desire is understood as a kind of belief rather 
than an appearance (Oddie this volume) or a non-cognitive attitude 
(e.g., Friedrich, Döring and Eker, Lauria this volume). As 
mentioned earlier, there are some difficulties in accounting for desire 
in terms of beliefs. Gregory’s contribution goes a long way toward 
rebutting a number of objections. He considers worries concerning 
desires’ direction of fit, appetites, and objections about the sufficiency 
and necessity of the view. Let us mention two examples that tightly 
connect with other key issues in the volume. We already mentioned 
that desires differ from beliefs in terms of direction of fit. How, then, 
could a desire be a belief? Gregory argues that desires have both 
(p.14) 
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directions of fit and that the same is true of beliefs about practical 
reasons. More importantly, it is common to think that desires cannot 
be assimilated to beliefs on the grounds that non-human animals have 
desires but lack beliefs (Friedrich, Döring and Eker this volume). 
Against this objection, Gregory considers the possibility that non-
human animals have a minimal grasp of reasons to act and thus, in a 
sense, have normative beliefs. Alternatively, it might be that non-
human animals have drives rather than desires. Finally, Gregory 
argues that his account is superior to the appearance view, i.e. the 
idea that desires are appearances of the good (Oddie this volume) or 
of reasons (Scanlon 2000). Appearances, he argues, are unlike desires 
in that they fall outside our rational control.
Gregory does a great job at undermining the main difficulties 
associated with the desire-as-belief account. The objections examined 
are reminiscent of the ones that have been raised against the view 
that desires are evaluative beliefs and that have often been used to 
dismiss it without being carefully examined. This similitude raises the 
following question: Should desires be understood in terms of beliefs 
about reasons rather than in terms of beliefs about values or other 
normative entities such as norms? Are we to identify values with 
reasons, in which case the two proposals would boil down to the same 
thing? This is where the philosophy of desire meets vexed meta-
ethical issues.
From another perspective, one might wonder whether identifying 
desire with belief is supported by empirical evidence. Lewis famously 
argued that reducing desire to belief cannot accommodate the 
regulation of desire and belief predicted by Bayesian models of 
decision making, which is the main empirical model in economics 
(Lewis 1988). It is also an open question whether reducing desire to 
belief is compatible with neuroscientific studies in this area. The next 
section touches on these questions.
Empirical Perspectives: Desire, the Reward System, and Learning
The nature of desire can also be approached with the help of the 
empirical evidence on the subject, in particular through the lens of 
neuroscientific findings on the reward system and models of 
decision making in economics. Given the importance of these 
perspectives, an exploration of the nature of desire would be 
incomplete without taking this literature into consideration.
Drawing on previous work, Schroeder’s contribution, entitled 
“Empirical Evidence against a Cognitivist Theory of Desire and 
Action,” is mainly inspired by neuroscientific findings on desire, 
(p.15) 
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motivation, and action. His aim is to assess Scanlon’s (2000) view of 
desire and motivation by confronting it with the neuroscientific 
evidence. Scanlon claims that motivation stems from judgments about 
reasons for action and that desires, in the wide sense of the term, are 
judgments about reasons for actions. Scanlon’s proposal shares 
interesting connections with that of Gregory. More generally, let us 
call “cognitivism” the view that some judgment or cognition about 
reasons or values is the source of motivation. Schroeder’s question is 
whether cognitivism is in line with the available empirical evidence. 
The relevant literature in neurobiology, he argues, suggests a 
negative answer. Importantly, it appears that the neural structures 
relevant for motivation are distinct from the ones involved in 
cognitions like perception, memory, and belief. Cognitivism is thus in 
serious tension with the empirical evidence. And none of the ways 
that cognitivism may try to accommodate the empirical evidence, 
Schroeder argues, is likely to succeed. These attempts to reconcile 
cognitivism with the empirical findings might explain alienated 
actions, like Tourette syndrome, or habitual actions. Yet they cannot 
be the whole story about motivation and action. Schroeder then 
warns against philosophical analysis that lacks proper empirical 
guidance.
In a similar spirit, in “Learning as an Inherent Dynamic of Belief and 
Desire,” Railton builds on neuropsychological findings about desire 
and affect as well as on models of human behavior to be found in 
economics. As observed, it is common in philosophy and economics to 
think of belief and desire as the main determinants of human 
behavior. This Humean picture is partly motivated by the directions of 
fit of belief and desire. But is it compatible with learning in the realm 
of desire, i.e. the thought that we can improve our desires as we can 
improve our beliefs and cognitions? Learning comes with tracking 
facts. The direction of fit metaphor suggests that learning is the 
purpose of belief only, since beliefs aim to represent the world, unlike 
desires. Against this skepticism, Railton offers a model of learning for 
desire that is inspired by the way beliefs are regulated and, ironically, 
exploits Hume’s account of belief as a feeling. In a nutshell, the 
thought is that learning in belief is made possible by the expectations 
and feelings of confidence that come with believing. Subjects learn 
what to believe by confronting their expectations and feelings 
of confidence with the facts that are presented to them. Similarly, 
desires are regulated by means of comparisons between the positive 
anticipation they are associated with (the “liking” aspect of desire) 
and the actual satisfaction of the desire. When desiring something, 
unlike when experiencing an urge, one is not merely disposed to act 
(p.16) 
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in a certain way: one sees the thing in a positive light. Studies on the 
reward system, at least for non-pathological cases, reveal that desires 
involve positive anticipation of reward. Now, this provides room for 
learning in desire as the positive anticipation can be compared with 
one’s actual experience of desire satisfaction. With the help of 
feedback afforded by experience, one will learn what to desire, as one 
does for belief, by reducing discrepancy and by testing one’s 
expectations and positive evaluations in the arena of life.
These findings and the philosophical considerations they elicit 
provide important insights for understanding desire. They raise 
ontological and metaphysical issues that are particularly relevant for 
the theories of desire explored in this volume.
For example, we may wonder whether Railton’s proposal implies that 
desires are motivational states grounded in evaluation, in which case 
the proposal would be a variant of the motivational conception. 
Alternatively, we may think that the picture favors a compound view, 
in which desire is a whole made of evaluation and motivation or, more 
simply, that desires are multitrack dispositions, as one contribution in 
this volume suggests. This touches on the important ontological 
question of how types of mental states should be individuated.
Similarly, one question that is relevant to Schroeder’s essay concerns 
the commonsense interpretation of the idea that desires are 
representations of rewards. Does it favor the evaluative view of desire 
or the motivational conception? Does it provide support for an 
alternative account of desire? In previous work (Schroeder 2004) and 
in his present contribution, Schroeder argues that the literature on 
the reward system does not favor the hedonic, evaluative, or 
motivational pictures of desire. How, then, are we to translate these 
findings into folk psychological terms?
II. Desiderative Puzzles
As outlined earlier, a better understanding of the nature of desire has 
wide-ranging significance. In the second part of this volume, three 
puzzles pertaining to practical rationality are addressed and 
approached from the perspective of the nature of desire. They 
concern, respectively, the philosophy of mind, ethics, and 
epistemology. These issues are analogous to hotly debated questions 
on theoretical rationality. Yet the practical side of the inquiry is often 
left untouched. The first topic examined is desire inconsistency. Some 
desires are inconsistent. Is this to be understood along the same lines 
as inconsistency between beliefs? Does it teach us something about 
desire? The second issue is the direct practical analogue of 
(p.17) 
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theoretical reasoning. Desires, it is commonly thought, figure into the 
process of deliberating about what to do. They are commonly viewed 
as the first premise of practical reasoning. How are we to understand 
this feature? What should desires be to play such a role? The last 
puzzle concerns self-knowledge. Self-knowledge has been widely 
discussed in the case of belief. How are we to understand self-
knowledge of one’s desires? What does it reveal about the nature of 
desire? The last contributions aim to fill these lacunas in the 
philosophical literature. Let us briefly summarize how.
Juliet desires to be faithful to her partner while also desiring to have 
an affair. Something is wrong with this combination. Why is it so? This 
is the main question addressed by Wall’s contribution, “Desiderative 
Inconsistency, Moore’s Paradox, and Norms of Desire.” More 
specifically, Wall discusses Marino’s contention that there is nothing 
especially or necessarily problematic with desiderative inconsistency 
(e.g. Marino 2009). What goes wrong pertains to the subject’s well-
being—one of her desires is not satisfied—and thus has no special 
connection to desire inconsistency. Moreover, desiderative 
inconsistency is not necessarily bad, since some desires are better not 
satisfied. By contrast, Wall argues that there is something especially 
and necessarily wrong in having inconsistent desires: the subject 
violates a constitutive norm for desire. It is common to think that 
beliefs are constituted by the norm of believing the truth. Wall 
extends this approach to the case of desire so as to shed light on 
desiderative inconsistency. To do so he makes use of Moore’s Paradox, 
the well-known puzzle of belief. Asserting “p and I do not believe that 
p” or believing that p and I do not believe that p is an odd thing to say 
or to believe (Moore’s Paradox). This can be explained by the violation 
of the norm of belief: one should believe the truth. Mutatis mutandis, 
this norm explains what is wrong with inconsistent beliefs. If a similar 
paradox for desire can be found, it will reveal the existence of a 
constitutive norm for desire. Elaborating on previous work (Wall 
2012), Wall proposes that the desire that p and I do not desire that p
is such a case. The oddness of this desire suggests that desires are 
constituted by the norm of avoiding frustration. Having inconsistent 
desires violates this norm and is thus necessarily wrong 
irrespective of the subject’s well-being or other considerations. This is 
analogous to the case of belief.
Wall’s use of constitutive norms in approaching the issue of the 
nature of desire is promising. Yet proponents of the evaluative 
conception of desire have argued that desires are constituted by the 
norm of the good and have thus proposed cases of Moore’s Paradox 
(p.18) 
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along evaluative lines, for instance, “I desire that p and p does not 
seem good to me” (Stampe 1987; see Oddie 2005 for another 
proposal). How does Wall’s candidates for Moore’s Paradox and 
norms of desire connect with the ones inspired by the conceptions of 
desire examined in this volume? Is the norm of avoiding frustration 
compatible with them, or is it to be preferred over them? This is 
where the normative approach of the mental that appeals to 
constitutive norms meets the approach of the mind adopted so far in 
this volume, which focuses on the intentionality or functional role of 
desire understood in descriptive terms.
Desire seems to play an important role in practical deliberation. 
According to the traditional understanding, desires appear as the first 
premise of the reasoning. Discussions on the nature of deliberation 
are often focused on the result of the deliberative process. In 
“Deliberation and Desire,” Schueler’s pioneering approach aims to 
question the role of desire in such a process and, by doing so, to shed 
light on the nature of desire. We do not deliberate about everything 
we desire. For instance, I do not deliberate about my whim of seeing 
my neighbor’s front lawn filled with wildflowers even if I favor this 
state of affairs. Consequently, it would appear that the ‘favoring’ view 
does not accommodate the role of desire in practical deliberation. 
That is why Schueler argues that desires can play this role only if they 
are conceived as being representations of aims or purposes. But do 
desires qua representations of aims actually figure in the first premise 
of practical deliberation, as the traditional picture has it? Since 
practical deliberation is a kind of reasoning, the first premise must be 
understood as being a belief about one’s desire. Now, this belief can 
be false: Othello can believe that he desires something, when in fact 
he does not. It thus appears that one can deliberate from a desire that 
one does not have, and so, contrary to received wisdom, desires do 
not play a significant role in practical reasoning. This being said, 
subjects who intentionally did something resulting from a process of 
deliberation eo ipso wanted to do so. For intentionally bringing about 
something entails having this thing as an aim, i.e. desiring it. This is 
puzzling. On the one hand, it appears that deliberation doesn’t involve 
actual desire; on the other hand, desire is necessarily involved in 
deliberation when the latter results in intentional action. How 
are we to disentangle this puzzle? Schueler proposes distinguishing 
between two kinds of practical reasoning. We sometimes reason from 
our beliefs about what we desire and determine the action that suits 
their satisfaction. In this case, desire can be absent from the process, 
since the belief about desire does not imply the presence of the 
desire. But we sometimes deliberate differently, starting with our 
(p.19) 
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intentions. As soon as I have formed the intention to go for coffee, I 
might deliberate about the best means of doing so and settle on the 
appropriate actions. In this case, the starting point is the intention 
itself—not a belief. This is what happens when we act out of 
deliberation. The goal of an intention is something we want, so it 
appears that this type of deliberation requires a desire. Desires, 
however, do not figure into the content of this sort of deliberation: 
they are constituted by the actions based on deliberation. The puzzle 
is thus dissolved.
At least two issues that connect with other pieces in this volume are 
worth noting. Schueler argues that we do not deliberate from our 
desires when the latter are understood as states of favoring. Is it to 
say that desires cannot be the starting point of deliberation insofar as 
they are understood as evaluations? Turning to the case of Radioman, 
one might be inclined to think that the evaluative nature of desires is 
what provides them with the power to explain action. Is it not the 
case, then, that the evaluative dimension of desires is also the key for 
understanding their contribution to deliberation?
The second issue concerns the extent to which intentions are immune 
to the type of error desires are liable to. Can’t we be wrong in our 
beliefs that we have some intentions (even when we act on them), in 
the same way that we can falsely believe that we desire something? 
This raises the issue of self-knowledge that is the focus of the final 
contribution.
In “Introspection and the Nature of Desire,” Ashwell explores desire 
from the viewpoint of self-knowledge. We can know other people’s 
desires by observing their behavior. In contrast, we have direct access 
to our own desires: we do not need to observe them; we can 
introspect them. While the question of how we know our own beliefs 
is familiar, its desiderative counterpart is more rarely investigated. 
The originality of Ashwell’s contribution lies in the way her account of 
desire introspection is informed by various views of desire. She 
argues that desires are not evaluations but are better viewed as 
motivations. Indeed, we commonly attribute to ourselves evaluative 
beliefs without attributing corresponding desires. For instance, in the 
case of weakness of will, I can introspect my belief that going to the 
gym would be a good thing while being aware that I do not 
desire to go to the gym. If that is the case, desires cannot be 
evaluative beliefs, as the self-attribution of the latter can be rightly 
separated from that of the former. The appearance view of desire—
that desires are seemings of value—fares better in this respect, 
however. In being weak-willed, going to the gym might not appear 
(p.20) 
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good to me, hence I neither desire to go nor do I introspect this 
desire. This being said, the appearance view does not provide the 
right phenomenological picture of desire. While experiencing my 
desire to have another glass of wine, I do not only experience this 
state of affairs as good; I am also aware that I am drawn to act in a 
certain way. These feelings of motivation are an integral part of desire 
and the basis on which we introspect them. The weak-willed person 
does not introspect any feelings of motivation and hence does not 
attribute to herself a desire. Consequently, one condition for a reliable 
introspective access to our desires is that desires be motivational 
rather than evaluative states.
Comparing Ashwell’s picture to other contributions in the volume 
brings them into sharper focus. Her argument relies on the 
assumption that weakness of will comes with absence of desire. But is 
it so? Gregory argues that weakness of will involves a failure of 
motivation rather than a failure of desire: one lacks the motivation to 
realize a desire that one has. How best to capture the nature of 
weakness of will, then?
This in turn touches on the question of whether feelings of motivation 
are necessary features of desire and thus of desire introspection. 
Famously Strawson has argued that we can conceive of creatures 
having desires without any motivation: Weather Watchers desire 
sunshine without being motivated to act in any way (Strawson 2009). 
Leaving this thought experiment to one side, some contributors to 
this volume discuss actual cases of desiring subjects who are not 
motivated to act. Being weak-willed, in one description, is such a case 
(Gregory this volume); being severely depressed is another (Lauria 
this volume). These conditions might impair one’s motivational system 
and feelings without affecting one’s desire and presumably one’s 
knowledge of them. This is one way of making the question of 
whether motivation is the essence of desire particularly salient—
which is this volume’s starting point.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that this collection creates the ground 
for a more systematic debate on the nature of desire. It is high time 
that contemporary philosophers paid more attention to desire and put 
into question the dogmas associated with it. In exploring various 
conceptions of desire from different perspectives, and in examining 
how these conceptions can illuminate many issues in several domains, 
we hope that this volume makes a first step toward reinstalling 
desire at the heart of our philosophical preoccupations.
Notes
(p.21) 
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